The reality status of directives and its coding across languages[1]

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Abstract

In languages in which there is an opposition between realis and irrealis markers, directives (i.e. forms encoding positive directive situations: imperatives, hortatives, jussives, etc.) happen to be encoded by irrealis markers, by realis markers, by both, or they may be neutral with respect to this distinction. This apparently messy behaviour raises the question of what the use of (ir)realis markers in directives means, and, more generally, of how relevant reality status as such is to the coding of directive situations across languages. In this paper, we propose an explanation for the cross-linguistic behaviour of directives with respect to (ir)realis marking based on diachrony and on the functional components of the directive situation: after identifying the commonest diachronic sources of directives, we argue that the distinction between actualized and unactualized states of affairs is not directly relevant to the cross-linguistic coding of directive situations, but it may be relevant to the coding of other functional domains, which in turn provide the main diachronic sources for directive constructions. In other words, the presence of (ir)realis markers (or their absence) is to be explained simply as one of the possible morphosyntactic properties of the source construction, which tends to be maintained also in the target, not as the manifestation of an inherent realis, irrealis or hybrid nature of directive situations. Moreover, the extension of a source construction to the coding of directive situations is not motivated by the logical irreality shared by the source and the target function, but is based on more local semantic similarities between the source and the target construction that are independent of the notion of (un)actualized state of affairs as such.

1. Introduction

Some languages are said to mark a distinction between actualized and unactualized situations by means of a morphosyntactic opposition between so-called *realis* (or neutral) and *irrealis* markers (see Cristofaro, this volume, and de Haan, this volume for a critical approach to the notion of (ir)realis). In these languages imperative situations, i.e. situations in which the speaker desires a state of affairs (henceforth SoA) to become true and appeals to the addressee to help make this SoA true, happen to be frequently encoded by irrealis markers. In South Efate, for instance, the only indications of the imperative meaning of (1a-d) are the irrealis subject proclitics and, in some cases (e.g. in (1a)), the use of the irrealis form of the main verb, involving a stem-initial mutation with respect to the corresponding realis/unmarked forms (the verb stem meaning 'make' is *preg-* in the realis/unmarked form, and *freg-* in the irrealis form). The same irrealis subject proclitics (in combination with the irrealis form of the verb, whenever such a form exists) are also used to express futurity/intentionality as in (1e) or to mark the predicate in certain complement clauses (such as those depending on verbs of wanting, as in (1f)):

[1] This paper is the result of joint work by the two authors. Caterina Mauri has written sections 3 and 4, while Andrea Sansò has written sections 1 and 2. We wish to thank Alexandra Aikhenvald, Sonia Cristofaro, and Johan van der Auwera for discussing many of the issues discussed in this paper with us and for providing insightful comments on earlier versions of it. We also thank the audiences at the Forlì workshop on (ir)realis and at the 3rd Syntax of the World's Languages Conference (Berlin, September 2008). The usual disclaimers apply.

(1) South Efate (Austronesian, Eastern Malayo-Polynesian, Oceanic; Thieberger 2004: 164-165)

a. ***pa=freg****-pun* *te-ne* *me* ***tak=fo*** *to* *mailum*
2SG.IRR=make:IRR-dead DET-this and **1PL.INCL.IRR=PSP:IRR** STAT slow
traus.
speak
"Turn off this (tape recorder) and we will have a little talk."

b. *tesa,* ***ko=fam*** *nanrmem!*
child **2PL.IRR=eat:IRR** banana
"Children, eat the bananas!"

c. ***ke=fa****=n* *pato* *emae.*
3SG.IRR=go:IRR=DIST stay far
"Let him go and stay a long way away."

d. *i=nrik* *kori* *ses* *ga* *nen* *kin* *na,* *"****Tak****=sef".*
3SG.REAL=tell dog small 3SG.POSS that COMP say **1DU.IRR**=escape
"He said to his small dog, 'Let's go!'."

e. *komam* ***rak****=tap* ***fam*** *mau* *me* ***rak****=to.*
1PL.EXCL **1DU.IRR**=NEG **eat:IRR** NEG but **1DU.IRR**=stay
"We won't eat, but we'll stay."

f. *he* *a=muri-n* *na* ***pa****=mai* *ni* *Kaltog* *preg*
hey 1SG.REAL=want-TS-3SG.OBJ COMP **2SG.IRR**=come BEN K. make
nalkis, *i=wel* *ku=f* *tae* *preg-i-ø*
medicine 3SG.REAL=thus 2SG.REAL=COND know make-TS-3SG.OBJ
"Hey, I want you to bring some medicine for Kaltog, if you can do that."

Cross-linguistic studies concerned with (ir)realis generally mention the preferential association between imperative situations and irrealis markers. Neither in the literature on (ir)realis, however, nor in cross-linguistic studies on imperatives has this association been convincingly explained. In her typological survey of imperatives, for instance, Schalley (2008: 98ff) simply lists irrealis forms among the most common indirect (i.e. morphologically non-dedicated) imperative strategies. Chafe (1995: 350) and Mithun (1995: 376) do not go much beyond relatively simplistic statements concerning the "imagined rather than directly perceived or remembered" (Chafe 1995: 350) character of imperative situations, i.e. their being inherently future-projecting situations. The picture is made more complex by the fact that there are other languages in which there is a morpho-syntactically coded binary distinction between actualized and unactualized SoAs, and in which imperative situations are marked as realis. A case in point (but see Section 2.2 for further examples) is Guahibo. The marking of (ir)realis in Guahibo is an instance of what Palmer (2001: 145) calls a *joint system*, in which a(n) (ir)realis morpheme co-occurs with another morpheme which encodes the specific subtype of (ir)realis: the verbal complex has a slot for two alternative markers, the affixes *-pa* and *-nae* (both with allomorphs), distinguishing between factual and non-factual (labelled "virtual") predications. These markers attach directly to the verbal root, and other temporal and modal suffixes usually combine with only one of these two affixes: the future and imminent suffixes, for instance, require the virtual affix as in (2c) and (2d), the negative prefix automatically selects the virtual suffix as in (2b), whereas the imperative suffix may combine with both the factual, as in (2a), and the virtual affix, as in (2e):

(2) Guahibo (Guahiban; Queixalós 1998: 171; 2000: 376)

a. *pitsa-**pa**-re!*
go.out-**FACTUAL**-IMP
"Go out!"

b. *apo-po-**nae***
NEG-leave-**VIRTUAL**
"He doesn't go / isn't going."

c. *po-**nae**-ena*
go-**VIRTUAL**-FUT
"He will go."

d. *po-**nae**-hitsia*
go-**VIRTUAL**-IMMIN
"He's going to go."

e. *x-**ae**-ma*
eat-**VIRTUAL**-IMP
"Eat!"

The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in the comprehension of the relation between (ir)realis strategies and imperative situations. In particular, this requires us to answer three basic questions that can be phrased as follows:

(i) what does the use of (ir)realis markers to encode imperative situations mean?
(ii) More generally, what is the reality status of imperative situations, and
(iii) how relevant is reality status as such to the coding of imperative situations across languages?

The analysis will be based on a convenience sample of 183 languages, chosen from various language families with a view to maximizing genealogical diversity. The sample is given in the Appendix.

Before addressing the three questions in (i)-(iii), some preliminary discussion is necessary. So far, we have referred only to (ir)realis markers, i.e. to **forms** that are said to encode various types of (un)actualized situations. Indeed, at least since Givón (1984: 285ff) and Chung & Timberlake (1985: 241ff), the two terms *realis* and *irrealis* have gained increasing currency in the literature on modality as flexible cover terms for a number of forms traditionally labelled as 'indicative', 'subjunctive', 'optative', 'counterfactual', 'potential', 'hypothetical', etc. Some authors, however, have gone a step further, speaking of *reality status* (or *status*) as a grammatical category to full right, on a par with better established categories such as tense and aspect. This category, realized differently in different languages, has at least two values, *realis* (or neutral) and *irrealis*, generally characterized in terms of actualization vs. non-actualization of a given SoA (Foley & Van Valin 1984: 213-220; Van Valin & La Polla 1997: 41; Elliott 2000). Under this view, a proposition is realis if it "asserts that a SoA is an actualized and certain fact of reality", whereas it is classified as irrealis if "it implies that a SoA belongs to the realm of the imagined or hypothetical, and as such it constitutes a potential or possible event but it is not an observable fact of reality" (Elliott 2000: 66-67). On the formal side, reality status may be coded by means of an array of morphosyntactic strategies (simple affixation, portmanteau affixation, sentence particles, adverbs, auxiliation, segmental mutations, etc.).

As the papers in this volume extensively show, however, there are alternative views of the realis/irrealis dichotomy in the literature. Chafe (1995: 363), for instance, considers reality status as a **parameter** relevant to the grammatical organization of the world's languages. In his view the realis-irrealis distinction is a "covert semantic pressure that emerges in different languages in different ways": while it is "clear and ubiquitous" in some languages, it fails to be overtly marked in other languages such as English, where, however, it is "felt through the irrealis creation of an environment in which referents may be interpreted as nonspecific" (Chafe 1995: 364). Still others have criticized the idea that the distinction between actualized and unactualized SoAs plays a role in the world's languages, and have assumed instead that the multifunctionality patterns that characterize (ir)realis markers are actually based on notions other than that of "unactualized SoA" as such (Bybee *et al.* 1994, Bybee 1998, Bendix 1998, Cristofaro, this volume, among others). Bendix (1998: 250ff), for instance, argues that forms labelled "irrealis" in the grammars of individual languages more often than not arise as the result of **implicature** or other pragmatic

reasoning (Bendix 1998: 253): such forms may have an actual meaning that is more restricted (e.g. a potential meaning), and may come to be used to express reference to other irrealis situations (e.g. counterfactual or future situations) on the basis of simple inferential reasoning. Such inferences "may become conventionalized as part of the meaning of a form or, probably better, as though they were part of the meaning of the form" (Bendix 1998: 252), but there is no reason to assume that (ir)realis markers are the manifestation of a coherent grammatical category. Though not excluding that a general notion of "unactualized situation" may determine a speaker's use of particular forms for encoding specific conceptual situations and plays a role in the diachronic processes of extension of particular forms from one conceptual situation to another, Cristofaro (this volume) shows that many multifunctionality patterns of so-called "irrealis" markers are based on contextual inferences that are independent of the notion of unactualized SoA as such.

It is not our intention here to discuss whether "reality status" can be considered as a proper grammatical category, nor to question the descriptive validity of the labels "realis" and "irrealis" for the languages in which such a distinction is postulated to exist. The aim of this paper is somewhat more restricted: we only want to address the question whether (ir)realis markers are used to refer to imperative situations by virtue of their general (un)actualized meaning or whether instead this pattern can be accounted for in some other way. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, it is sufficient to define *reality status* as a **semantic dimension** with two poles, *realis* and *irrealis*, defined in purely logical terms on the basis of the actualization vs. non-actualization of a given SoA.

As far as imperatives are concerned, we will henceforth abandon the label "imperative" in favour of a more general label, namely "directive". We will use the term *directives* to refer to the set of forms that encode positive directive situations in a language (for prohibitives in connection with (ir)realis, see van der Auwera & Devos, this volume). By *directive situations* we mean all those situations in which

(3) the **speaker** *wishes* a SoA to become true and conveys an *appeal* to the **addressee(s)** to help make this SoA true. The **performer(s)** of the action(s) required to bring about the desired SoA may coincide (i) with the addressee, (ii) with the speaker, (iii) with a third party or (iv) with any possible combination of (i)-(iii).

In the most typical directive situation, the performer coincides with the addressee (second person singular: 2). Languages, however, are generally able to express directive speech acts addressed to the addressee plus a third party (second person plural: 2+3), to the addressee plus the speaker (first person plural inclusive: 1+2), and to a third party (third person singular or plural: 3, 3+3):

(4) a. *Go away*! (2, 2+3)
b. *Let's go*! (1+2)
c. *Let him/her/them go*! (3, 3+3)

By definition, the *addressee* takes part in the speech act. In order to be successful, a directive situation minimally comprises the speaker and the addressee, who may or may not coincide with the performer. If the addressee does not coincide with the performer he/she may be intended as the mediator of the request/command, as in (4c). Third person performers, on the other hand, are not necessarily present when the appeal is uttered. Indeed, they are **typically distant in space** from the place where the directive situation takes place.

There are at least two reasons for adopting the terms "directives" and "directive situation". One is merely terminological: the grammars of different languages use very different terms to refer to forms and constructions encoding directive situations. In particular, the label *imperative* is generally reserved for directive speech acts in which the addressee coincides with the performer, while for other performers other labels are used (*hortative*, *co-hortative*, *exhortative*, *injunctive*, *jussive*, but

also, somewhat less appropriately, *optative* or *deontic*). This terminological variety may engender confusion in a cross-linguistic study. This choice is in principle compatible with similar terminological choices made in other typological studies on directives: Birjulin & Xrakovskij (2001), for instance, simply generalize the term *imperative* to non-second person directives, while van der Auwera *et al.* (2003) use the term "imperative-hortative system" to refer to forms encoding directive situations in a language. The second reason is more substantial: the terminological variety in this domain reflects the fact that forms encoding directive situations are seldom formally homogeneous within a given language, and their formal differences are generally associated with the different performers to which the speech act is addressed. The plethora of terms used to refer to such forms may therefore conceal the substantial semantic/conceptual unity of the directive situation, which is demonstrated by the cases in which a given directive strategy extends from one person to another (see below, Section 3.1) as well as by the fact that there are languages in which a formally homogeneous directive paradigm for all the persons exists (van der Auwera *et al.* 2003: 52ff).

The definition of the directive situation in (3) implicitly states that the desired SoA has not occurred yet. Hence, in purely logical terms, directives encode unactualized situations. This is indeed the common explanation for why directives are often irrealis-marked in languages in which there is a morphosyntactic opposition between realis and irrealis. However, there are other components of the directive situation that make the unactualized character of the desired SoA somewhat less central than it is to other situation types such as future or potential situations. Firstly, a directive situation is deeply rooted in the deictic **here-and-now** in which the speech act is uttered, and requires both the speaker and the addressee to take part in the speech act. Moreover, the most typical directive situation is a manipulative speech acts in which the speaker has legitimate authority over the addressee, and has accordingly high expectations concerning the eventual fulfilment of his/her wish (Givón 1990: 806ff).

If we take all these various facets of the directive situation into account, the explanation that is generally invoked for why directives are often irrealis-marked appears to be partial and one-sided: if we say that the logical irreality of the desired SoA is mirrored by the fact that irrealis forms are often used to encode directive situations, what should we say in cases such as (2a) above, in which a directive situation is coded by means of a realis form? Should we admit that in these cases the expectations as to the immediate fulfilment of the desired SoA play some role in grouping the directive situation together with other realis situations? Accounting for this differential behaviour of directives in terms of the inherently hybrid or multifaceted nature of the directive situation risks to be at the very best a case of circular reasoning: directives behave this way because the directive situation is inherently hybrid between the (logical) irreality of the desired SoA and the high expectation of its actualization, but this hybridness is not postulated on independent grounds. In other words, it simply derives from the messy behaviour of directives, which happen to be encoded by means of either realis or irrealis strategies from language to language (and even within a single language, see Section 2.3).

In this paper we will put forward a different type of explanation based on diachrony and on the functional components of the directive situation, that will be discussed in more detail in Sections 3 and 4. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to deal with the attested cross-linguistic variation of directives with respect to (ir)realis marking. It is to this task that we turn in the next Section.

2. Realis and irrealis markers in directives

A typological survey of directives in languages in which an overt realis-irrealis dichotomy is said to exist shows that there are many mismatches between the logically unactualized nature of the desired SoA and the marking of directives as either realis or irrealis. The picture is quite complex and hardly predictable, and all the possibilities are attested. In some languages directives are treated

as irrealis, while in other languages they are treated as realis. Moreover, there are languages in which different types of directives behave differently with respect to (ir)realis marking, as well as languages in which directives are insensitive to this dichotomy. These cases will be analyzed in order in the next subsections, starting from those languages in which directives are marked as irrealis (Section 2.1), and moving on to languages in which they are marked as realis (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 will be devoted to the discussion of a few more complex cases.

2.1. Irrealis markers

Most languages with an overt realis/irrealis dichotomy treat directives as irrealis. In our sample, this is by and large the most frequent pattern in languages with overt (ir)realis markers. We will exemplify this pattern by means of two examples.

In Tsou there is a basic dichotomy between a realis (*mi-*, with allomorphs) and an irrealis (*te-*, with allomorphs) auxiliary. Auxiliaries in this language serve as hosts for person markers, forming phonological words with them and preceding the main uninflected verb. Besides conveying a range of unactualized meanings (e.g. future, (5b), counterfactual (5f), and hypothetical (5g) meanings), the irrealis auxiliary also occurs in directives ((5c-d)). In second person directives the irrealis auxiliary does not carry any person marker ((5d)):[2]

(5) Tsou (Austronesian, Tsouic; Zeitoun 2005: 279-281)

a. ***mi****-ta* *etamaku*
AV.REAL-3SG.NOM AV.smoke
"He is smoking."

b. ***te****-ta* *etamaku*
AV.IRR-3SG.NOM AV.smoke
"He will smoke."

c. ***te****-to-n'a* *mimo*
AV.IRR-1PL.NOM-again AV:drink
"Let's have (another) drink."

d. ***te*** *mimo* *to* *emi*
AV.IRR AV:drink OBL wine
"Drink wine!"

e. *upena* *ne moso* *mu-chu* *nehucma,* ***ntoh****-ta* *c'o* *moyafo*
though if AV:rain yesterday **AV:IRR**-3SG.GEN only AV:go.out
"Even if it had rained yesterday, he would have (still) gone out."

f. ***nte****-ta* *mosi* *ta* *pangka* *ta* *emi*
AV:IRR-3SG.NOM AV:put OBL table OBL wine
"He may put the wine on the table."

g. *honci-'u* *eaa* *peisu,* ***nte****-'o* *mihia* *emoo*
if-1SG.NOM have money **AV:IRR**-1SG.NOM AV:buy house
"If I have money, I will buy a house."

In Nunggubuyu the reality status of a given situation is encoded by means of portmanteau prefixes that also encode the subject. The irrealis subject prefixes combine with different suffixes yielding different irrealis meanings. This is a structural feature common to other non-Pama-Nyungan languages of Australia, in which "mood is not marked in one specific slot in the morphological structure of the verb, but spread over at least two slots, marked by a combination of

[2] According to de Haan (this volume), the terms 'realis' and 'irrealis' in Zeitoun's grammar of Tsou (Zeitoun 2005) must be simply intended as notional categories, given the wide variety of morphological shapes of the various (ir)realis auxiliaries, none of which form a paradigm. In the absence of any diachronic evidence as to the relatedness of (ir)realis auxiliaries, it is possibly more cautious not to think of Tsou as a language with a morphosyntactic opposition between realis and irrealis markers. The fact remains, however, that some similarities in shape can be ascertained among the various auxiliaries, some of which may have originated from a basic auxiliary combined with other elements. Moreover, the irrealis auxiliary used for directive situations is identical in shape with the auxiliary used for future situations, or, in other words, one of the auxiliaries in this system is multifunctional and its two functions fall within the realm of non-actualization.

morphemes in a prefix and a suffix slot" (Verstraete 2005: 224). In particular, the combination between the irrealis subject prefix and the non-past suffix expresses both directive and future situations:

(6) Nunggubuyu (Australian, Gunwinyguan, Nunggubuyu; Verstraete 2005: 232; Heath 1984: 339)

a.	***ba***=*bura:-v*	b.	***ama***=*lhan^{g}a-n^{g}*	c.	***n^{g}and***-*a:bi:-na*
	2SG.IRR=sit-NPST		**CLF.IRR**=stand-NPST		**1SG.IRR**-jump-NPST.CONT
	"Sit!"		"Let it (the vehicle) stop."		"I will jump."

From these two examples it should be sufficiently clear that languages using an irrealis marker for directives usually employ the very same form also to encode other unactualized situations (future, potential, etc.). In other words, the coding of directive situations is but one of the functions of irrealis-marked structures in these languages. We are thus left with two possible explanations for why such irrealis-marked structures are used to express a directive situation: we might suppose that directives are marked as irrealis by virtue of the non-actualization of the desired SoA in the directive situation, or we can argue that the presence of the irrealis marker is (primarily) motivated by the other functions for which the structure is used (future, optative, potential, etc.). In other words, a structure with an originally future/potential/etc. meaning might have spread to other contexts such as the directive situation. If this latter hypothesis turns out to be true, we should conclude that the irrealis marker is only indirectly connected to the logical irreality implied by the directive situation. In order to test this hypothesis empirically, we should be lucky enough to know something about the history of these irrealis-marked structures. Unfortunately, in most of the languages with overt (ir)realis markers there is hardly anything known about the history of these markers. Some insights into the possible diachronic sources of directive markers, however, can come from the lucky cases in which the connection between a given directive strategy and its source is still synchronically evident, or from diachronically better investigated languages in which the diachronic sources of directives can be identified with reasonable certainty. These languages (see Section 3) show that directive situations are expressed quite commonly by markers historically deriving from (and still synchronically connected to) markers of future, optative, and potential (i.e. typically irrealis) situations, and thus the diachronic evidence they provide may have a heuristic value when dealing with cases in which there is no such diachronic certainty.

2.2. Realis markers

In some languages with overt (ir)realis markers, directives group together with other realis situations. In Tukang Besi, for instance, the reality status of a SoA is encoded by means of two different sets of subject prefixes, a realis and an irrealis one. Directives use the former set, as in (7c-d). The same set is used for on-going (past and present) situations as in (7a), and for imminent future situations, as in (7e), whereas more distant future situations employ the irrealis set of subject prefixes, as in (7b):

(7) Tukang Besi (Austronesian, Western Malayo-Polynesian, Sulawesi; Donohue 1999)

a.	***no***-*wila*	*legolego*		b.	***na***-*baiara-'e*
	3.REAL-go	arms.swinging			**3.IRR**-pay-3.OBJ
	"He was walking, swinging his arms."				"She's going to pay."

c. ***i**-sumbere-waliako!*
2PL.REAL-immediate-return
"Go back home this instant, you lot!"

d. ***to**-manga-do*
1PL.REAL-eat-EMPH
"Let's eat first!"

e. ***no**-baiara*
3.REAL-pay
"She's about to pay."

In Wari' the reality status of a situation is coded by means of three kinds of verbal inflectional clitics (VICs) expressing person, number, and gender (for third person) of the subject, and primary object. The three VICs move on a continuum from realis past/present on the one side to irrealis on the other in which "realis future occupies the middle area" (Everett & Kern 1997: 326). The **realis future VIC**, used for second person directives as in (8a), generally characterizes situations that have not yet happened, for which "there is always the possibility that they will not happen, but, usually, they are believed to be likely to happen" (Everett & Kern 1997: 326, adapted). A case in point is the "instructional" context in (8c). Realis past/present VICs are used for situations perceived by the speaker to be real, as in (8d), whereas the irrealis VIC is used for unreal, unlikely to happen situations, as in the deontic predication in (8b).

(8) Wari' (Chapacura-Wanhan; Everett & Kern 1997: 36, 37, 92, 326)

a. *tacam' horon **ra-in** (me)*
cut big.PL **2SG.REAL_FUT-3N** (EMPH)
"Cut them big!"

b. *xac 'a **xim-on** memem*
eat:fruit NEG:SG **2SG.IRR-3SG.M** fruit
"You should not eat that fruit."

c. *'oc 'iri ta'-in ca' ne, 'oc **ra-in***
stick already:PL 1SG:REAL_FUT-3N this.N REC.PST stick **2SG:REAL_FUT-3N**
xije-in taraji-con ma'
otherness-3N ear-3SG.M that.PROX
"When I pierce this ear, you pierce his other ear."

d. *cao' **nana-in** mijac 'oro wari'*
eat **3PL.REAL_PRS/PST-3N** pig COLL person
"The people ate the pig."

In Caddo, "mood in the TAM system is divided into two superordinate categories, realis and irrealis" (Melnar 2004: 82), and the choice between the realis and the irrealis set of pronominal prefixes is determined by the grammatical markers that occur before these prefixes. TAM markers referring to present, past ((9g) and (9i)), and future (9h) actions co-occur with the realis set of pronominal prefixes. Directive situations are expressed by six overt "imperative" morphemes co-occurring with the realis pronominal prefixes. In addition, "a realis verb construction that lacks … an overt tense or inflectional aspect suffix, but includes a second person agent, is interpreted as a command" (Melnar 2004: 87), as in (9f). Pre-pronominal prefixes expressing negation (9a), prohibitions (9b), obligations (9c), conditionals (9d), and content questions (9e) require the irrealis set of pronominal prefixes.

(9) Caddo (Caddoan; Chafe 1995: 350, 358; Melnar 2004)

a. *kúy-**t'a**-yibahw*
NEG-**1:AG:IRR**-see
"I don't see him."

b. *kaš-**sahʔ**-yibahw*
PROH-**2:AG:IRR**-see
"Don't look at it!"

c. *kas-**sa**-náyʔaw*
OBL-**3:AG:IRR**-sing
"He should sing."

d. *hí-**t'a**-yibahw*
COND-**1:AG:IRR**-see
"If I see it…"

e. ***sahʔ**-yibahw-nah*
2:AG:IRR-see-PFV
"Have you seen him?"

f. ***yahʔ**-yibahw*
2:AG:REAL-see
"Look at it!"

g. *dikat-**yahʔ**-yibahw-nah*
WHAT-**2:AG:REAL**-see-PFV
"What have you seen?"

h. ***ci**-yibahw-ʔaʔ*
1:AG:REAL-see-FUT
"I'll look at it."

i. *hít#**ci**-binah-saʔ*
PST#**1:AG:REAL**-fight-IPFV
"I fought."

Even in languages in which a realis marker is used to encode directive situations this very same marker is also often employed for (on-going) present/past and/or immediate future situations. This means that even in these cases we cannot be sure that directive situations are marked as realis by virtue of the legitimate expectations as to the immediate fulfilment of the desired SoA. An alternative explanation is also possible: the presence of the realis marker could be (primarily) motivated by the other functions for which the structure is used (on-going activities, immediate future, etc.), i.e. a realis-marked structure with present/future semantics might have spread to other contexts such as the directive situation.

2.3. Both or none: directives out of the realis/irrealis dichotomy

Before discussing such an alternative explanation, it is necessary to deal with some more complex cases. These include: (a) languages in which an overt dichotomy between realis and irrealis markers exists but directives fall outside this dichotomy (either being unmarked for reality status or clustering together with other situation types marked differently), and (b) languages in which an overt dichotomy between realis and irrealis markers exists but directives behave differently depending on the performer.

Bukiyip is a language in which a distinction between realis and irrealis situations is overtly marked and in which directives are (at least partially) insensitive to this distinction. In this language, there is a pervasive opposition between a realis and an irrealis prefix. Directives are formed in various ways: in a class of verbs, the prefix *kwV-* is added to the verb stem (as in (10d)); the directive form of other verb classes consists in the bare stem without the "person + (ir)realis" prefix complex (as in (10e)). In still other classes, however, the imperative prefix is similar to either the realis or the irrealis prefix (see (10g), where *-é-* is an allomorph of the realis prefix, and (10f), respectively):

(10) Bukiyip (Torricelli, Kombio-Arapesh; Conrad & Wogiga 1991: 18, 95-96)

a. *nabotik* *ch-**a**-Ø-nú* *n-a-gak*
yesterday 3PL.MIX.SBJ-**REAL**-hit-3SG.OBJ.M 3SG.M.SBJ-REAL-die
"Yesterday they hit him, and he died."

b. *kaman* *ch-**ú**-naki*
tomorrow 3PL.MIX.SBJ-**IRR**-come
"They will come tomorrow."

c. *nabotik* *wo* *n-**ú**-naki* *e*
yesterday PST.NEG 3SG.M.SBJ-**IRR**-come PST.NEG
"Yesterday he didn't come."

d. ***kwa****-taglú*
IMP-go.out
"Go out!"

e. *n-**a**-bihi* → *bihi*
3SG.M.SBJ-**REAL**-come_down come_down[IMP]
"He came down." "Come down!"

f. *n-**u**-bo* → *ny-**u**-bo*
3SG.M.SBJ-**IRR**-hit you-**IMP**-hit
"He will hit." "Hit!"

g. *n-**a**-ø-nu* → *p-**é**-ø-nu*
3SG.M.SBJ-**REAL**-hit-him you:PL-**IMP**-hit-him
"He hit him." "Hit him!"

In Limilngan there are two prefixes (a realis and an irrealis one) that combine with an array of tense/aspect suffixes (past imperfective, past perfective, future, present) yielding different meanings (past perfective/imperfective, counterfactual, negative past, negative present, negative future, apprehensive etc.). In addition, there is a third prefix (labelled FUTURE, allomorphs: *-i-*, *-in-*) that combines with a future suffix yielding intentions and predictions. The same combination (FUT prefix + FUT suffix) is also used to address orders to all persons except the 2nd person singular (cf. (11c-e)). The future suffix alone (allomorphs: *-yuk*, *-k*, *-yi*, …) is used to convey orders addressed to a 2nd person singular performer, as in (11a). The irrealis prefix combined with the future suffix conveys evitative meanings, as in (11f). Table 1 summarizes the different combinations between prefixes (or lack thereof) and suffixes in the domain of futurity.

(11) Limilngan (Australian, Limilngan; Harvey 2001)

a. *langan* *ni-**yuk*** [2nd person singular directive]
meat cook-**FUT**
"Cook some meat!"

b. *nginyi* *gurdumardi* *l-iny-**i**-ni-**yuk*** [future (2nd person)]
2M catfish II<2M-**FUT**-cook-**FUT**
"Are you going to cook catfish?"

c. *anbayk* *∅-um-**in**-mildinyu-**k*** [1st person plural directive / future]
wind IV<1+2M-**FUT**-leave-**FUT**
"Let us leave the wind!" / "We will leave the wind."

d. *ja-wi-k* *b-alkgan* *mimilung* *m-**an**-yi* [3rd person directive / future]
DEF-I-DIST 3I-small tucker III-**FUT**-eat
"Let that kid eat the tucker!" / "That kid will eat the tucker."

e. *w-**in**-a-**yi*** [3rd person directive /future]
3I-**FUT**-go-**FUT**
"Let him go!" / "He will/should/must go."

f. *ngiliyi* *da-na-k* *bi-rr-**a**-wa-**yi*** [evitative]
dog DEF-II-DIST 2M<3-**IRR**-bite-**FUT**
"That dog might bite you."

Table 1. *Limilngan Prefix-Suffix combinations in the future/directive domain.*

Prefix	*Suffix*		*Resulting meaning*
--	FUT	→	2nd person singular directive
FUT	FUT	→	Future/directive (except for second person singular)
IRR	FUT	→	Evitative

In Tawala too, directives do not group together with either realis or irrealis. Three morphologically distinct moods exist in this language: *realis* (morphologically unmarked, as in (12a)); *irrealis* (*-ta-*, cf. (12b)), and *potential* (*-na-*; cf. (12c-d)). The free form future tense marker

apo can be used in conjunction with the potential mood to encode future actions/events, as in (12c). The potential mood is also used to encode directive situations, as in (12d-e) (with 2nd person singular performers the subject prefix is often omitted):

(12) Tawala (Austronesian, Western Malayo-Polynesian, Oceanic; Ezard 1997)

a. *meka i-#-nae?*
where 3SG-**REAL**-go
"Where has he gone?"

b. *ega i-**ta**-nae*
NEG 3SG-**IRR**-go
"He didn't go."

c. *(apo) i-**na**-nae*
(FUT) 3SG-**POT**-go
"He will go."

d. *o-**na**-lowo!*
2PL-**POT**-run
"Run away (you lot)!'

e. *#-**na**-bulili*
2SG-**POT**-run
"Run (fast)!"

Finally, in Caodeng rGyalrong only some kinds of directives are marked as irrealis, depending on the performer: orders to 2nd and 1st person plural performers ((13a-b)) are treated as realis, and thus are left unmarked just like other realis situations (e.g., the predictive future in (13e)), while an irrealis marker is used for 3rd person directives, as in (13c-d).

(13) Caodeng rGyalrong (Sino-Tibetan, Tibeto-Burman, rGyalrong; Sun 2007: 807, 809-810)

a. *ɐ-vzər **nə**-nɐʃəʃə*
1SG:POSS-side **IMP**-go.away
"Get away from me!"

b. *rtənmuʔ pe-tsə kə*
marriage do-1DU SFP
"Let's get married!"

c. ***ɐ-tə**-^{n}dzɐ*
IRR1-**IRR2**-eat
"Let her/him eat it!"

d. *tʃ^{h}ə ne-tə-səseʔ **ɐ-nə**-^{n}grəvɪʔ*
what IPFV-2-want **IRR1**-**IRR2**-succeed
"May whatever you wish for come true!"

e. *támu té-stet mími rgaŋluʔ ʃə-lɐt-aŋ*
rain IPFV-let.up as.soon.as ball go.and-play-1SG
"As soon as the rain lets up, I will go and play ball."

3. Broadening the scope: the lesson of diachrony

What has been identified as a problem in the preceding sections might turn out to be the key to understanding (i) what languages code when they code the reality status of directives, and (ii) to what extent reality status is relevant to the coding of directive situations.

On the one hand, cases in which no (ir)realis markers are present and cases in which both realis and irrealis markers are possible (see section 2.3) suggest that reality status is but *one of the factors at play* in the coding of directive situations, perhaps not even a central one. On the other hand, the multifunctionality patterns described in sections 2.1 and 2.2 point to possible *diachronic extensions* of a specific form to new functions. In other words, the presence of (ir)realis markers in constructions encoding a directive situation might be due to the fact that the strategies at issue originally were, say, optative or future strategies, which then acquired also a directive function.

As already discussed in Section 1, the presence of both realis and irrealis markers in directive constructions is challenging for a logico-semantic definition of (ir)realis based on the (non)actualization of the SoA (cf. Elliott 2000), because in principle directive situations should instantiate prototypical cases of unactualized SoAs, thus excluding the use of realis markers. Despite the interest of this apparently atypical behaviour, the hybrid position of directives with respect to (ir)realis marking has not been systematically investigated until now in the debate on irrealis. Two scholars, however, have remarked the presence of realis markers in directive constructions in two particular languages, and have elaborated hypotheses on the motivations

underlying such an unexpected behaviour: Chafe (1995) on Caddo and Mithun (1995) on Maricopa. Before moving on to our explanation, let us examine their positions.

Both Chafe and Mithun provide two different explanations, one based on the functional and semantic properties of directive situations, and the other connected to the diachrony of the languages they analyze. As for the first type of explanation, they both acknowledge the *inherent functional hybridness* of directive situations alluded to above (Section 1).

Chafe (1995: 358) argues that reality status can be conceived of as a *gradient dimension*, rather than as a binary opposition between real and unreal situations, and directives have "a status intermediate between the extremes of realis and irrealis", because they "express ideas that are judged to be relatively more in accord with reality than, say, yes-no questions or negations". Along a parallel line of reasoning, Mithun (1995: 377) suggests that the use of realis markers in directives might have to do with the high expectation of compliance that characterizes these situations. Speakers might intentionally mark commands as realis in order to convey a "strong certainty of their immediate realization".

Besides such purely functional analyses, both Chafe and Mithun also suggest the possibility of a diachronic explanation. Mithun (1995: 377) argues that in Maricopa "one possible explanation [for the categorization of imperatives as realis, *CM&AS*] could come from the order in which an emerging Irrealis form might be applied to new contexts over time". In turn, Chafe (1995: 359) underlines that imperatives and futures, stemming from a more ancient layer of Caddo morphology, "would […] have failed to participate in the more recent grammaticalization of irreality in the pronominal prefixes". In other words, both Mithun and Chafe postulate the rather recent emergence of irrealis markers, which would have not spread to all the unactualized situations yet.

As will become clear from the following discussion, data in our sample provide evidence for a diachronic explanation of the distribution of realis and irrealis markers in directive constructions. Yet, the diachronic analysis we propose is not based on the distinction between innovative and conservative areas of grammar, or, so to speak, on the incomplete extension of irrealis markers to all the putatively irrealis domains, but rather on the multifunctionality patterns attested in the coding of the directive function, which have been already mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.2. In our view, the distribution of (ir)realis markers in directive constructions is connected to particular paths of semantic change, along which constructions expressing specific functions acquire also a directive value, and to the particular diachronic sources that lead to the emergence of directive strategies.

In what follows evidence will be provided for this hypothesis. In section 3.1.1, three main types of diachronic paths will be identified and related to the three basic semantic components of any directive situation (wish, appeal and expectation). Each type of diachronic path will be in turn described and exemplified in detail. Section 3.1.2 is devoted to the analysis of the attested diachronic paths with respect to a crucial parameter, namely the person of the performer (1st, 2nd or 3rd person). It will be argued that in most cases the different source constructions develop into directive strategies starting from specific persons and extend to other persons following a non-random order. This fact will point to the distinguishing functional role played by person in the coding of directive situations. In section 3.2 we will provide an overall unified account of the regularities attested in both the diachronic development of directive constructions and the distribution of (ir)realis markers in directives, arguing for the dependence of the latter on the former. It will be shown that there are certain diachronic processes that may lead to the presence of (ir)realis markers in directives *if* such markers are already present in the source construction, whereas other types of diachronic paths tend to generate directive strategies that are insensitive to this dichotomy (cf. section 2.3).

3.1. The sources of directive constructions

3.1.1. Diachronic paths

Any directive situation can be described as a situation characterized by three main components:

(14) A. the speaker *wishes* that a SoA become true;
B. the speaker conveys an *appeal* to the addressee(s) to help make this SoA true;
C. the speaker *expects* the desired SoA to be brought about in the immediate future.

Data in our sample show that the diachronic paths leading to directive constructions may be ascribed to three main types, which focus on the three components (14A-C) of the directive situation itself (see Mauri & Sansò submitted for a detailed discussion).[3]

The WISH-TYPE. The diachronic paths ascribed to the first type are characterized by source constructions expressing the ***wish*** of the speaker that the desired SoA take place, thus focusing on component A in (14) ('the speaker *wishes* that a SoA become true').

The first path in question is OPTATIVE > DIRECTIVE. We define as optative forms those strategies encoding an optative situation, i.e. a situation in which the speaker wishes that a SoA become true but does not convey any appeal to the addressee to help make this SoA true. The directive use of optative strategies typically starts in those situations in which the speaker's wish is focused on at the expenses of the appeal to the addressee. This normally happens when the performer of the action coincides with a *third party* (3rd persons), which is typically absent from the speaker's here-and-now. Once the whole construction is reinterpreted as directive, it may extend to 1st persons and even to 2nd persons, following the hierarchy in (15):

(15) OPTATIVE > 3RD PERSON DIRECTIVE > 1ST PERSON DIRECTIVE > 2ND PERSON DIRECTIVE

The development of 3rd person directives from optative forms is exemplified in (16) from Kusunda. In Kusunda, a class of transitive verbs that lack a dedicated imperative form their imperative by means of a construction including the imperative of the light verb 'do' preceded by a nominal contributing the predicative content, as in (16a). The same class of verbs employs *ə-ge*, the optative of the light verb 'do', + a nominal in directive constructions addressed to third persons, as in (16c). Moreover, a handful of transitive and intransitive verbs has a suffix *-gya* in directives addressed to 3rd person performers. This *-gya* is homophonous with the 3rd person optative of the verb 'go' (16d), and therefore it can be hypothesized, as Watters (2006: 82) also suggests, that we have to do with the grammaticalization of an originally optative form into a 3rd person directive marker:[4]

[3] In the literature on directives a distinction is frequently made between dedicated (or direct) and non-dedicated (or indirect) strategies (cf. Birjulin & Xrakovskij 2001: 8-9; van der Auwera *et al.* 2005: 294; König & Siemund 2007: 311, Schalley 2008: 22). However, in a diachronic perspective such as the one adopted in this paper, the distinction between dedicated and non-dedicated forms is not a central one, because in principle what looks as dedicated on a purely synchronic ground is likely to be the result of diachronic processes in which the source construction/marker was non-dedicated. Therefore, as far as a strategy is systematically employed to encode a directive situation (be it dedicated or not), it will be the object of a diachronic analysis aimed at identifying the successive stages that led to the emergence of its use as a directive strategy.

[4] Examples of languages in which the *optative > directive* path extends from 3rd person to 1st person and 2nd person directives are Noon (optative > 3rd person directive > 1st person directive; Soukka 2000: 189) and Manchu (optative > 3rd person directive > 1st person directive > 2nd person (polite) directive; Gorelova 2002: 297).

(16) Kusunda (isolate; Watters 2006: 81-82)

a. *pumba əgo*
beat make-IMP
"Beat (it)!"

b. *ə-ge*
make-OPT
"May he do it!"

c. *pumba əge*
beat make-OPT
"Let him beat it!"

d. *g-ya*
3-go.OPT
"May he go!"

e. *bəl-gya*
descend-OPT
"Let him descend!"

The second attested path is COMPLEMENT CLAUSES AFTER MODAL/DESIDERATIVE/UTTERANCE PREDICATES > DIRECTIVE. Complement clauses after modal, desiderative, and utterance predicates, which are formally subordinate clauses, are often used as main clauses with a directive function. This is a typical case of insubordination, intended, following Evans (2007: 367), as "the conventionalized main clause use of what, on prima facie grounds, appear to be formally subordinate clauses". As argued by Evans, insubordinated clauses show features that are typical of subordinate clauses, such as non-finite verbal forms, subordinate word order and complementizers, and the process of insubordination as a whole can be described as a diachronic continuum. The development of the insubordination process starts with the ellipsis of the main clause: at this stage, the reconstruction of the ellipsed material is usually open to a number of interpretations, which are then gradually restricted to a limited set (the elliptic construction is conventionalized). The final stage of insubordination consists in the conventionalization of the whole construction, which comes to be associated to a specific meaning of its own and it is not possible to restore the ellipsed material any more (Evans 2007: 374).

Evans remarks that "by far the commonest type of insubordination is found in various types of clause concerned with interpersonal control – primarily imperatives and their milder forms such as hints and requests, but also permissives, warnings and threats" (2007: 387). Among the constructions that fall into this type, cases in which the ellipsed main clause conveys the speaker's desire are extremely frequent.

The most frequent contexts in which complement clauses insubordinate into directive main clauses are those in which the ellipsed main clause contains an utterance predicate or expresses the speaker's wish ("I'm saying that" "I wish that…", "it would be nice if…"). This process typically starts from 3rd persons. Once reinterpreted, the formerly subordinate clause may spread to directive situations addressed to other persons. The development of directive constructions from complement clauses is schematized in the cline in (17):

(17) COMPLEMENT CLAUSE (AFTER UTTERANCE/MODAL/DESIDERATIVE PREDICATES) > 3RD PERSON DIRECTIVE > 1ST PERSON DIRECTIVE, 2ND PERSON DIRECTIVE

In Basque directive forms in which the performer is a third person (as in (18a)) may make use of the suffix *-(e)la*, the unmarked declarative complementizer (cf. (18b)).

(18) Basque (isolate; Oyharçabal 2003: 282)

a. *eta ez badago etxian, datorr-ela bere andria*
and not if.is home.at come.3SG-COMP his wife
"And if he's not at home, let his wife come!"

b. *udaltzainek ukatu dute Rubioren bizkartzain zir-ela*
policemen.ERG deny AUX Rubio.GEN bodyguard were-COMP
"The town policemen have denied that they were Rubio's bodyguards."

In Albanian the modal complementizer *të* is used in main clauses with a directive function for all kinds of performers (3rd person, 2nd person, 1st person plural):[5]

(19) Albanian (Indo-European, Albanian; Ammann & van der Auwera 2004: 297-298)

a. *ti, Agim, shko te nëna dhe Rexhepi të rrijë*
you Agim go.IMP.2SG to mother.NOM.DEF and Rexhep MOD_COMP stay.SBJV.3SG
këtu!
here
"You, Agim, go to your mother, and Rexhep is to stay here! (=let Rexhep stay here)"

b. *hajde të ikim!*
come.on MOD_COMP go.1PL
"Come on, let's go!"

c. *sapo të vijë ky shoku, ta*
once MOD_COMP come.SBJV.3SG that comrade MOD_COMP+him
marrësh
take.SBJV.2SG
"Once that guy comes, take him…"

The APPEAL-TYPE. The diachronic paths ascribed to the second type are characterized by source constructions referring to a ***preliminary action*** which is necessary for the desired SoA to be brought about. This action may consist of a displacement ('go', 'come') or of a permission ('let'), thus focusing on the *appeal to the addressee* to do something in order for the SoA to be brought about (component B in (8)). The source constructions belonging to this type are semantically heterogeneous, but a unified discussion of these cases is motivated first of all by the fact that they all share a twofold internal structure consisting of two events (preliminary event and ordered event), and secondly by the fact that they all include the reanalysis of a directive form addressed to a 2nd person as a general directive marker.

Let us start by analyzing the diachronic path 'GO' > DIRECTIVE. The directive form of a motion verb meaning 'go' (= "motion away from the speaker") typically starts grammaticalizing as a marker of the directive function in directive situations in which the performer is requested to move away from the speaker. Prototypically, it is a 2nd person performer that is invited to move away from the setting in which the speech act takes place in order to bring about the desired SoA. The development of a general (non-motion) directive construction out of a directive form 'go!' follows the path described in (20):

(20) GO ([AND] DO X) > 2ND PERSON (MOTION) DIRECTIVE > 2ND PERSON (NON-MOTION) DIRECTIVE

Directive constructions derived from 2nd person 'go' directives seem to be restricted to directive situations addressed to 2nd persons, and no further extension is attested in our sample. Let us now exemplify the two cut-off points along the cline in (20). The first cut-off point is attested in Jingulu (21), where the most common means of marking directive situations is the general irrealis marker *-mi* (21a-b). However, this language also has the possibility of encoding a directive situation by means of a different construction, which is instead insensitive to the realis/irrealis distinction (21c-d). In this construction, the imperative of motion *-yirri* (lit. 'go.IMP') is used as an affix, mainly when the command involves motion away from the site of commanding ('go and…!').

[5] For Albanian, as well as for other Balkan languages, an insubordination scenario in which a desiderative or, more generally, a modal predicate has been dropped, leaving the subordinate clauses alone with a directive function is preferrable to the opposite scenario postulating a reverse path, from independent main clause to subordinate clause (see the discussion in Ammann & van der Auwera 2004: 306).

(21) Jingulu (Australian, West Barkly; Pensalfini 2003: 230-231)

a. *jama-rni* *wilwili-kaji* *ya-ju* *karningka* *wirrkiyi-**mi***
that-FOC hang-through 3SG-do lest fall-**IRR**
"It's hanging, swinging, might fall."

b. *kalarra* *ngaja-**mi***
west see-**IRR**
"Look west!"

c. *ngibi-**yirri***
hold-**go.IMP**
"Take it!"

d. *ngabarnda* *ngibi-**yirri***
shoulder have-**go.IMP**
"Carry him on your shoulders!"

The second cut-off point is exemplified by the Tetun example in (22), in which *bá* ('go') is used at the end of a command or invitation for the addressee to do something without the speaker, even in those contexts in which no motion is involved.

(22) Tetun (Austronesian, Central Malayo-Polynesian; Williams-van Klinken *et al.* 2002: 68)

imi *hán* *bá*
2PL eat go
'You (plural) eat up!'

The second path ascribed to the Appeal-type is the one that derives directive strategies from verbs meaning 'come' (= "motion towards the speaker"): 'COME' > DIRECTIVE. The directive form of a 'come' verb addressed to a 2nd person typically develops into a marker of the directive function in those situations in which the addressee is invited to move towards the speaker, in order to undertake the desired action together with her/him. This type of complex event is thus typically reinterpreted as a directive situation addressed to the speaker + the addressee, even in those cases in which no motion towards the speaker is implied, following the cline in (23):

(23) $\text{COME}_{[\text{DIRECTIVE.2SG}]}$ (AND/TO DO X) > 1ST PERSON PL.INCL. DIRECTIVE

As we saw for the GO > DIRECTIVE path, also directive constructions resulting from the diachronic path in (23) do not seem to extend to persons other than the one in which the reanalysis occurs. We can recur to Tetun again to exemplify this path: besides the grammaticalization of '*bá*' as a directive marker for 2nd persons (example (22)), in this language there is also a directive strategy addressed to the speaker + the addressee that derives from the reanalysis of *mai*, the 2nd person directive form of the verb 'come' (24a-b). In the sentence in (24a), in which *mai* is followed by the verb *bá* used in its lexical value of 'go', the addressee is first asked to join the speaker in performing the desired action, consisting in a displacement away from the speaker's location. In (24b), instead, the situation does not presuppose any motion towards the speaker, and *mai* is simply employed as a general directive marker for 1st person plural addressees.

(24) Tetun (Austronesian, Central Malayo-Polynesian; Lumien van Klinken 1999: 208)

a. *ema* *tene* *ita* *r-ak* *"**mai*** *ita* *bá* *nebá"*
person invite 1PL.INCL 3PL-say **come** 1PL.INCL go there
"People invite us saying 'Let's go over there!'"

b. ***mai*** *ita* *hamulak*
come 1PL.INCL pray
"Let's pray!"

The third diachronic path ascribed to the Appeal-type is PERMISSIVE > DIRECTIVE. The directive form of a verb meaning '*let*' is frequently reanalyzed as a marker of the directive function in those

situations in which the addressee is ordered to allow a third party to do something. The construction is reinterpreted as a directive construction addressed to 3rd persons. Once reinterpreted, it may spread to 1st person plural inclusive directives, in which the original permissive meaning is **incompatible** (or at least less compatible) with the inclusion of the addressee into the set of performers (in the sense that one gives permission to do things more frequently to other people than to oneself; see Mauri & Sansò submitted for a more detailed discussion). In certain languages the originally permissive construction may also spread to 2nd persons, following the steps sketched in (25):

(25) LET$_{[\text{DIRECTIVE.2SG/PL}]}$ (X$_{[3P]}$ DO…) > 3RD PERSON DIRECTIVE > 1ST PERSON DIRECTIVE > 2ND PERSON

In Maltese, the form *ħalli*, originally the imperative singular form of the verb *ħalla*, 'to let' (cognate to Arabic *xalla*"; Vanhove 2000: 235), is commonly used in directives addressed to 3rd persons and 1st person plural performers (26a, b). *ħa* is the shortened form of this verb, which is only possible as a directive marker in 1st person plural directives (26c).

(26) Maltese (Afro-Asiatic, Semitic; Vanhove 2000: 236)

a. *ħálli nkɔmplu daʔšéyn awnékk*
HORT we.go.on a.little here
"Let's go on a little here!"

b. *ħálli yíkbɛr ikúːn yāf*
HORT he.grows.up he.is he.knows
"Let him grow up, he'll know!"

c. *ħa mmáʔdru náʔra l-frančīzi*
HORT we.despise a.bit the-French.PL
"Let's despise the French a little!"

US colloquial English (van der Auwera & Taeymans 2004: 240-241) provides an instance of extension of an originally permissive construction (the well-known *let's*) also to 2nd persons. As can be observed in (27), the clitic *'s* is no longer interpretable as referring to the 1st person plural and the whole construction with *lets* is employed as a general directive marker. The corresponding Dutch construction with *laten*, on the other hand, is restricted to 3rd persons and 1st person plural, and does not spread to 2nd persons (van der Auwera & Taeymans 2004: 242, 243).

(27) US Colloquial English (van der Auwera & Taeymans 2004: 241)
Lets you go first, then if we have any money left I'll go.

It must be remarked that the permissive construction is first reinterpreted as having a directive function in situations in which the performer is a third party, but phenomena of attrition (such as the development of *lets*/*let's* out of *let us*, and possibly also *ħá* < *ħálli* in Maltese) typically start when the construction has already extended along the cline, i.e. when it is used in directives addressed to the speaker + the addressee. In these communicative contexts the causative/permissive component of the construction is not transparent anymore, and the form is not interpretable as having a permissive value. It is therefore plausible that the construction as a whole is treated as a non-compositional unit, which then undergoes reduction processes.

The EXPECTATION-TYPE. The diachronic paths ascribed to the third type are characterized by source constructions depicting the desired SoA as imminent. The imminence can be expressed by means of (i) a future/intentional strategy or by (ii) a present, progressive strategy, thus focusing on the speaker's *intentions and expectations* that the SoA will be brought about in the next future (component C in (14)).

One of the most common sources for directive constructions are future and more generally intentional strategies (FUTURE/INTENTIONAL > DIRECTIVE). The directive use of such forms typically

starts in those situations in which the intention to bring about the desired SoA is in focus, and this normally happens when the performer (or one of the performers) of the action coincides with the speaker (1st persons). In specific contexts, the assertion of a future intention may be reinterpreted as having some directive illocutionary force, leading to a directive reading characterized by a strong intentional/auto-prescriptive value. After acquiring a directive function for 1st persons, the future/intentional strategy may then be reinterpreted as a general directive construction available for all persons, following the cline in (28):

(28) FUTURE/INTENTIONAL [1ST PERSON] > 1ST PERSON DIRECTIVE > 3RD PERSON DIRECTIVE, 2ND PERSON DIRECTIVE

Directive constructions derived from future forms are attested in a number of languages in our sample. In the following two examples an originally future strategy has been reinterpreted as a directive strategy and has extended to directive situations in which the performer is the addressee (2nd person). In Erromangan (see (29)) a 2nd person singular future can be interpreted as a polite imperative, while in Önge (see (30)) the only way to encode a directive meaning for a 2nd person singular performer is the 2nd person form of the future.

(29) Erromangan (Austronesian, Eastern Malayo-Polynesian, Oceanic; Crowley 1998)

a.	*∅-tovop*	b.	*ko-ntovop*
	2SG:IMP-BR:laugh		2SG:FUT-MR:laugh
	"Laugh!"		"Laugh!" (polite)

(30) Önge (South Andamanese; Dasgupta & Sharma 1982: 34)

n-ilokowale-nene
2SG-eat-FUT
"You will eat." / "Eat!"

In (11) the case of Limilgan has been analyzed, which exemplifies the use of future affixes to convey directive situations addressed to all persons. In (31), instead, the use of future strategies only for directives addressed to 1st persons is exemplified by a sentence in Wappo. The suffix *-siʔ* in this language is employed for 'uncertain future, intentional' and is opposed to a different future suffix *-yaːmiʔ*, which is instead associated to more certain predictions or imminent actions. The uncertain future strategy is commonly used to convey directives addressed to 1st persons.

(31) Wappo (Wappo-Yukian; Thompson *et al.* 2006: 47)

hopa-kʼa	*isi*	*mesi-**si**ʔ*
two-COM	1PL.NOM	make-**FUT**

"Let's do it together!"

The speaker's expectations regarding the imminent realization of the desired SoA are also at play in the diachronic path PRESENT/PAST > DIRECTIVE. The directive use of forms associated to present or past tense typically starts in those situations in which the *expectation* that the desired SoA will be brought about immediately is very high and is in focus, and this normally happens when the performer (or one of the performers) of the action coincides with the addressee(s) (2nd person). Present forms designate actions that are either already in progress at the moment of the speech or are to be completed right after, and past forms refer to SoAs that have already occurred. Strategies associated to the actual occurrence of a SoA, both at the moment of speech and in the past, are good

candidates for the expression of the notion of imminence (Birjulin & Xrakovskij 2001: 41), because they present the desired action as on-going or already realized, thus making it closer to the moment of the speech. Discussing the use of the past tense in Russian, Comrie (1985: 21) argues that in specific contexts it may convey "an indication of the imminence of the future situation – it is as if it were already present". Schalley (2008: 127) proposes that the directive use of constructions that are typically associated to present and past time reference "is due to the possibility to use these constructions with an imminent future sense through an indirect speech act".

In other words, when the performer is present (2nd person) and the desired SoA is already going on or could begin right after the speech act, the assertion of the SoA as located in the present or in the past may be easily reinterpreted as denoting the speaker's expectations regarding its imminent realization, and this in turn leads to a reinterpretation of the speech act as a directive one:

(32) PRESENT/PAST > 2ND PERSON DIRECTIVE

In Kartvelian languages, the use of past perfective constructions to express directive situations addressed to 2nd persons is common, as argued by Hewitt (1995: 571-572) for Georgian and by Anderson (1963: 57) for Laz. Example (33) shows the case of Laz, in which the same form is ambiguous between a past perfective interpretation and a 2nd person directive interpretation.

(33) Laz (Kartvelian; Anderson 1963: 57)

/*mómči*/
"You gave (it) to me." / "Give (it) to me!"

In Arabana the general present tense marker *-rnda* can be used to express a straight command where no great emphasis is implied, as exemplified in (34):

(34) Arabana (Australian, Pama-Nyungan; Hercus 1994: 181)

anari *yuka-rnda'*
this.way come-PRS
"Come over here!"

It must be remarked that in certain languages the verbal strategies used to convey present and past events are characterized on the basis of their aspectual properties, rather than the temporal ones. Therefore, in these cases, it is not straightforward to establish whether the extension of these strategies to directive situations is motivated (i) *indirectly*, by the fact that particular aspectual forms are associated to present and past events (typically, perfective aligns with past and imperfective with non-past, see Comrie 1976: 82-85) and, by virtue of this association, they are also exploited to express the notion of imminence, or (ii) *directly*, by the fact that particular aspectual properties are better candidates than others for the expression of the speaker's expectations regarding the imminent realization of the desired SoA. Van der Auwera *et al.* 2009 argue that imperatives have a *pragmatic perfectivity bias*, since they "involve an appeal to the addressee(s) to [...] perform the action as a whole", being most often 'result-oriented', and therefore triggering a perfective construal of the desired SoA.

At any rate, in both the direct and the indirect scenario strategies that are associated to the actual realization of a SoA are exploited to make the desired SoA closer to the moment of speech, by presenting it as if it were happening or as if it had already happened, or to stress its completion, by construing the event as perfective.

The extension of present/past forms, or perfective (and less frequently imperfective) forms to directive situations might also be explained on the basis of formal reasons, as argued, among others,

by van der Auwera *et al.* 2009. It is widely recognized that imperatives tend to be cross-linguistically simple constructions, and therefore they tend to be expressed by the simplest verb form available in a language. Hence, if in a given language the simplest form is the one employed for past/present events (as in (35) and (36)), or for the perfective aspect, it is plausible to hypothesize that such form may be exploited for directives also by virtue of its being morphologically simple.

Example (35) from Apurinã shows the use of the unmarked verb form commonly adopted for the present tense (cf. (35a)) in directive situations addressed to 2nd persons (35b,c). In example (36) from Yapese, on the other hand, the suffixed pronoun verb phrases (SPVP) without tense markers, which are the unmarked forms commonly attested for the expression of past events, are the only strategies available to encode directive situations addressed to 2nd and 1st persons.

(35) Apurinã (Arawak; Facundes 2000: 543)

a. *a-makatxaka-ru*
1PL-take.out-3M.OBJ
"We take it out."

b. *xamuna pu-taka xãã-poki-ã*
firewood 2SG-put flame-border-INSTR
"Put firewood in the fire!"

c. *ĩporãã pu-suka-no*
water 2SG-give-1SG.OBJ
"Bring me water!"

(36) Yapese (Austronesian, Western Malayo-Polynesian, Yapese; Jensen 1977: 211, cited in Schalley 2008: 95)

a. *mu maarow nga Donguch*
2.SPVP go.SPVP.2DU to Donguch
"You two went to Donguch." / "Go (du) to Donguch!"

b. *daarow nga Donguch*
go.SPVP.1DU.INCL to Donguch
"We (you and I) went to Donguch." / "Let's (you and I) go to Donguch!"

As underlined also by van der Auwera *et al.* 2009, in those cases where directives employ the simplest form available in the language, the functional and the formal motivation do not need to be necessarily in contradiction, but they may rather reinforce one another, especially if we consider that verb forms expressing present and past events are frequently the most unmarked ones. In other words, strategies such as the ones in (35) and (36) may be employed for directives *both* because they are associated to the actual (present, past or imminent) realization of a SoA, thus depicting the SoA as closer to its completion, *and* because they happen to be the simplest verb forms available in the language.

However, as widely exemplified throughout this paper, directives are also frequently encoded by means of *marked* verb forms too, be they dedicated or derived from strategies expressing present/past, future, or optative situations. In such cases, while the functional motivation is not challenged, the formal one is clearly contradicted. Since the formal and the functional motivations are often not in contradiction and the functional motivation holds also in those cases where the formal one is not applicable, the formal motivation seems to be weaker and less explicative than the functional one. For this reason, in the next section we will mainly focus on the functional contiguity existing between specific source constructions and specific types of directive situations, leaving further considerations on the formal/structural basicness of directives apart.

3.1.2. Different persons as different bridgeheads to the directive function

As should have become clear from the preceding discussion, the different source constructions develop into directive markers starting from specific persons, thus showing that in directive situations PERSON is not an epiphenomenon, but rather a functional factor. In this section it will be argued that the *identity of the performer* (1st, 2nd or 3rd person) crucially determines the type of directive speech act conveyed by the sentence, and it is possible to explain the correlation between particular diachronic paths and particular persons on the basis of the functional contiguity existing between particular source constructions and particular types of directive speech act, as determined by the identity of the performer.

If the P(erformer) coincides with the addressee, or a group of addressees – **2nd person directive** – the speech act conveyed is a prototypical command, in which the speaker has high control over the actualization of the SoA. Since speaker(s) and addressee(s) are both present when the speech act is uttered, the speaker's expectations regarding the immediate realization of the desired SoA are very high, in that the action can be completed right after the command has been uttered, or it may be already in progress, with the command consisting in its continuation, modification or end. The assertion of an imminent or on-going/realized event can be easily reinterpreted as having a directive function if the performer of the event is the addressee, because s/he necessarily knows that the SoA has not occurred yet and thus understands that the speaker's choice of a present/past form is not in a direct connection with the extra-linguistic reality, but is motivated by his/her high expectations of imminent actualization of the desired SoA. This explains why the path PRESENT/PAST > DIRECTIVE starts from 2nd persons.

Furthermore, commands addressed to the addressee(s) often imply a *displacement* away from the speaker in order to bring about the desired action (e.g. '*go and catch it!*'), which would not be possible for third parties (which might already be distant from the speaker) nor for the speaker(s) themselves, thus explaining why also the path GO > DIRECTIVE starts from directive situations in which the performer coincides with the addressee.

If P coincides with the addressee plus the speaker – **1st person plural inclusive directive** – the speech act is a mediated command, in which the addressee is typically invited to join the speaker in order to bring about the desired SoA. Directive situations addressed to the addressee + the speaker can be construed as complex events in which (*i*) the addressee is first ordered to move toward the speaker ('*come!*') and then (*ii*) the intention to bring about the desired SoA together is expressed. Such a twofold structure, involving a more or less explicit order to the addressee together with an auto-exhortation, motivates why COME is reanalyzed as a directive marker in directive situations addressed to the speaker + the addressee. Moreover, if the addressee is not directly addressed and P includes the speaker, the speech act has a future-projecting, auto-prescriptive component, which focuses on the speaker's expectations that s/he will bring about the desired SoA. The diachronic path FUTURE/INTENTIONAL > DIRECTIVE therefore typically starts in directive situations in which (one of) the performer(s) coincides with the speaker, because these are the only directive speech acts in which the speaker has complete control over the actualization of the order and this allows him/her to present the SoA as a future prediction/intention.

If the intended P is a third party – **3rd person directive** – the speech act is an exhortation to somebody who is typically absent to bring about the desired SoA. The speaker has lower control over the realization of the SoA, and the directive situation may be construed in at least two different ways, depending on the role assigned to the addressee. In case the appeal to the addressee is not explicit, the speech act typically consists of the expression of the speaker's wish that the third party realizes the SoA. In these cases, the request to do something for this to happen is left to inference and the addressee is treated as a pure witness of the assertion of the speaker's wish. The functional contiguity between this type of directive speech acts and the optative function provides an explanation for why the two diachronic paths OPTATIVE > DIRECTIVE and COMPLEMENT CLAUSES AFTER MODAL/DESIDERATIVE/UTTERANCE PREDICATES > DIRECTIVE start from 3rd persons. On the

other hand, in case the appeal to the addressee to help make the desired SoA true is explicit, the speech act is typically construed as a complex *causative/permissive* event, in which the addressee is ordered ('*let!*') to make/allow the third party to bring about the desired SoA. This type of directive speech act involves a preliminary action that typically consists in the transmission of the order to the performer by the addressee. The addressee may be simply a transmitter or may have some authority over the performer, which explains the functional contiguity between this type of speech act and permissive/causative constructions (PERMISSIVE > DIRECTIVE).

As exemplified in detail in section 3.1.1, once a given source construction acquires a directive function addressed to a given person, it may then extend to other persons along non-random clines (cf. also van der Auwera *et al.* 2004). Table 2 summarizes the attested sources and the diachronic paths discussed in the preceding section.[6]

Table 2. *Diachronic sources of directive constructions and their diachronic development.*

- *go*	> 2nd person directive
- *present/past*	> 2nd person directive
- *come*	> 1st person directive
- *future/intentional*	> 1st person directive > 3rd, 2nd person directives
- *optative*	> 3rd person directive > 1st person directive > 2nd person directive
- *insubordinated complement clauses*	> 3rd person directive > 1st person directive, 2nd person directive
- *permissive*	> 3rd person directive > 1st person directive > 2nd person directive

3.2. Neighbouring domains: the functional space around (and behind) the directive function

The directive situation is characterized by different functional properties, depending on the identity of the performer, on the basis of which we have identified different sub-types of directive speech acts (cf. van der Auwera *et al.* 2004; Birjulin & Xrakovskij 2001). In the preceding section, it has been argued that each of the source constructions examined "enters" the directive functional domain from the bridgehead that is closer to its semantics, i.e. from the type of directive speech act with which it shares the highest number of semantic features. Moreover, it has been shown that once a source construction enters the directive functional domain, it may further extend to different persons in a non-random order, following the paths summarized in Table 2.

Such synchronic and diachronic regular patterns of variation may be represented on a functional space (Fig.1), that is, in a network of interconnected functions that predicts the paths along which the source constructions under exam may develop into directive strategies. In Fig. 1 the different types of directive speech acts are indicated by the person of the performer and they are enclosed by a grey triangle, which encompasses the whole directive functional domain. The directive functional domain is in turn surrounded by other functions that turn out to constitute the main diachronic sources for directive constructions. Each function on the space is linked to the others by means of simple lines, which indicate the attested diachronic paths. Once a construction expressing one of the surrounding functions *enters* the directive domain from the type of directive speech act to which it is semantically closer, it may then spread to other types of directive speech act along the lines within the triangle.

[6] It might be argued that 2nd person directives often represent the last stage of the diachronic processes schematized in Table 2 only because languages usually have dedicated 2nd person directives while lacking directives for other persons. While in principle this may not be excluded in some cases, it must be remarked that: (i) there are also some processes of reanalysis that start from 2nd person directives, (ii) the associations between different source constructions and specific persons are guaranteed by the existence of the cut-off points described in section 3.1.1, and (iii) the notion of dedicated construction is rather questionable in a diachronic perspective (see above, note 2).

Figure 1. *The functional space around and behind the directive function.*



The question that should be addressed now is whether the functional space in Fig. 1 can predict or motivate the apparently messy distribution of (ir)realis markers in directives, or, in other words, whether the network of diachronic paths discussed in the preceding sections may explain the presence of realis markers, the presence of irrealis markers, the presence and the absence of both in directive constructions across languages. Fig.1 is perfectly compatible with the multifunctionality patterns identified in section 2 for realis and irrealis markers in directives. Realis markers attested in directive constructions typically also express some present/past temporal functions and tend to be associated with 2nd persons (cf. section 2.2). Irrealis markers attested in directive constructions typically also show an optative and/or future value, the former being associated to 3rd persons and the latter to 1st person plural (cf. section 2.1). The harmony between the attested diachronic paths and the multifunctionality patterns shown by (ir)realis markers in directive constructions supports the hypothesis of a unified diachronic explanation of the apparently hybrid behaviour of directives with respect to (ir)realis marking.

On the one hand, source constructions of the wish-type and of the expectation-type, i.e. optatives, complement clauses of modal/desiderative/utterance predicates, futures, present and past constructions (which are located above the directive functional domain in Fig.1), may display (ir)realis marking across languages. In particular, as argued in section 2, optatives and complement clauses may show irrealis markers (example (13d)) or no reality status markers (examples (16) and (18)); future/intentional constructions may show irrealis markers (examples (1e), (2c-d), (5b), (6c), (7b), (10b)), realis markers (examples (7e), (9h)), or no (ir)realis marker at all (examples (11) and (12)); finally, present and past constructions may show realis markers (examples (8d), (9i)) or no reality status markers (examples (33)-(36)).

On the other hand, source constructions for diachronic paths of the appeal-type (which are located below the directive functional domain in Fig.1) are characterized by a twofold structure, including the directive form of verbs meaning ‘go’, ‘come’ or ‘let’ addressed to 2nd persons followed by the verb referring to the desired SoA. The presence of (ir)realis markers in these constructions depends on the properties of the directive forms of ‘go’, ‘come’ and ‘let’, i.e. whether they are coded by means of (ir)realis markers or not in a given language, thus taking us back to the initial question and making the argumentation circular. However, regardless of the presence or absence of (ir)realis markers in these source constructions, the directive strategies generated by these paths in our sample are generally insensitive to the realis/irrealis distinction. This is plausibly due both to the fact that the original complex construction undergoes phenomena of attrition, thus resulting in opaque structures, and to the fact that ‘go’ and ‘come’ verbs frequently have suppletive roots for directives.

Therefore, directive constructions derived from the diachronic paths of the wish-type and the expectation-type provide the natural test-bed for our hypothesis. The exam of the diachronic sources

for directive constructions with (ir)realis markers shows indeed that the patterns represented in Fig.1 may explain the hybrid behaviour of directives with respect to the realis/irrealis dichotomy. In other words, the presence of (ir)realis markers in directives may be at least partially *derived* from the presence of (ir)realis markers in constructions encoding the neighbouring functional domains, which provide the diachronic sources for directive constructions.

If the source construction *does* show overt (ir)realis markers, these are normally inherited and kept in the directive strategy (examples (1)-(9)). If the source construction *does not* show any overt (ir)realis markers, the derived directive strategy does not show any (ir)realis marker either and falls outside the realis/irrealis dichotomy (examples (10)-(12), (21c-d)). If the source constructions are *heterogeneous*, i.e. if there are different sources for different persons, some with (ir)realis markers and others without, the derived directive constructions will mirror this heterogeneity (example (13)).

4. Conclusions: (ir)realis marking as an inherited feature

As stated in section 1, the aim of this paper is to investigate the distribution and the meaning of (ir)realis markers in directives, and to examine the relevance of reality status as such to the cross-linguistic coding of directive situations. The synchronic picture described in section 2 and the diachronic paths identified in section 3 revealed the close connection between the distribution of (ir)realis markers in directives and the diachronic sources identified for directive constructions, also highlighting the crucial role played by the identity of the performer in constraining the possible patterns of variation (§ 3.1.2). Finally, the functional space represented in Fig.1 was taken as the basis for a diachronic explanation of the cross-linguistic distribution of (ir)realis markers in directives (§ 3.2). In this concluding section, it will be argued that the major consequence of the present analysis is that (ir)realis marking is to be examined as an inherited feature in directives and it will be shown that such a diachronic explanation is more economic than a semantic one (cf. Chafe 1995 and Mithun 1995, discussed in § 3).

The distinction between actualized and unactualized SoAs is not directly relevant to the cross-linguistic coding of directive situations, but it may be relevant to the coding of neighbouring functions, which in turn provide the main diachronic sources for directive constructions. The extension of an (ir)realis form to directive situations along the paths sketched in Fig. 1 is *not* directly motivated by the logical irreality shared by the source and the target function. Such an explanation could not account for cases in which directives show only realis markers or both realis and irrealis markers, nor would it explain the recurrent association of particular diachronic paths to directive situations addressed to particular persons.

The attested diachronic paths are rather to be explained in terms of local and specific semantic solidarities, as discussed in § 3.1.2. Particular constructions acquire a particular directive function because they share specific semantic features with directive situations, and these semantic features constitute the basis for their reinterpretation as directives. Such semantic solidarities depend on both the functional properties of the source (i.e. focus on the speaker's intentions in the future; focus on the actual occurrence of the SoA in the past and the present; focus on the speaker's wish in the optative) and the functional properties of the type of directive speech act that constitutes the target, as identified by the person of the performer (i.e. 1st person directives have a future/intentional connotation; 2nd person directives are characterized by a direct control over the actual realization of the SoA; 3rd person directives are characterized by a lower control over the actualization of the SoA and therefore focus more on the expression of the speaker's wish). If the construction coding the source function shows (ir)realis markers, they will be kept even after the construction is reinterpreted as a directive strategy. In other words, the presence of (ir)realis markers is to be examined simply as one of the possible morphosyntactic properties of the source construction,

which tends to be maintained also in the target, not as the manifestation of an inherent realis or irrealis nature of directive situations.

A final question needs to be addressed, namely why a diachronic explanation of the hybrid distribution of (ir)realis markers in directives is preferable to an explanation based on the inherent semantics of directive situations. It could be argued, following Mithun (1995) and Chafe (1995), that the attested distribution of (ir)realis markers is motivated by the twofold nature of directives, which on the one hand imply a not-yet-realized SoA but on the other hand are characterized by high expectations of compliance. Yet, despite the fascination of such an explanation, there are at least three arguments in favour of a diachronic model based on the functional space in Fig.1.

First, the explanation based on the hybrid semantics of directive situations is rather vague and does not account for the regular patterns of variation attested both in diachrony and synchrony. Basically, such a semantic explanation does not assign any role to the identity of the performer, which instead crucially differentiates the various types of directive speech acts, constraining the possible multifunctionality patterns attested in directive constructions. By contrast, a diachronic explanation based on local semantic connections, as represented on the functional space in Fig.1, accounts for the differences existing between the various types of directive speech act as identified by the person of the performer and between their sources, predicting the regular patterns of variation attested in our sample.

Second, the diachronic explanation proposed in this paper treats the cases described in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 as sub-cases of a *single complex process*, namely the emergence and development of directives. Under this view, it is not necessary to build an *ad hoc* explanation for the messy distribution of (ir)realis markers in directives, which can be safely analyzed as a by-product of the diachronic processes through which directive constructions come into existence. A unified diachronic account based on local semantic solidarities can be argued to be more economic, because it makes it superfluous to look for a specific explanation in terms of the hybrid realis-*and*-irrealis semantics of directive situations.

Third, the diachronic explanation described in this paper can be empirically proved, because it is based on *observable paths of linguistic change*. By contrast, an explanation that is solely based on the inherent "hybrid reality status" of directive situations cannot be empirically proved, but is the result of mere speculation. However, it must be remarked that the acknowledgment of the conflict between the high expectation of actualization and the non-realized semantics of directives is not incompatible with the diachronic analysis proposed here. On the contrary, these conflicting aspects are particularly evident in specific types of directive speech acts (e.g. the high expectation of actualization is typically associated to directive speech acts addressed to 2nd persons) and are partially mirrored by the local paths of semantic change identified in Fig. 1. However, if not complemented by an independent diachronic survey, a purely semantic explanation fails to capture the regularities attested in cross-linguistic variation.

To sum up, (ir)realis marking is *secondary* and *inherited* in directives, and possibly shows up only when the markers used to encode the directive situation originally participated in a system of morpho-syntactic contrasts based on the realis-irrealis dichotomy.

Abbreviations

1, 2, 3 = 1st, 2nd, 3rd person; 2M = second person, minimal; I, II, III, IV… = noun classes; AG = agent; AUX = auxiliary; AV = actor voice; BEN = benefactive; BR = basic root; CLF = classifier; COLL = collective; COM = comitative; COMP = complementizer; COND = conditional; CONT = continuous; DEF = definite; DET = determiner; DIST = distal; DU = dual; EMPH = emphatic; ERG = ergative; EXCL = exclusive; FOC = focalizer; FUT = future; GEN = genitive; HORT = hortative; IMP = imperative; INCL = inclusive; INF = infinitive; IMMIN = imminent; INSTR = instrumental; IPFV = imperfective; IRR = irrealis; M = masculine; MIX = mixed gender; MOD_COMP = modal complementizer; MR = modified root; N = neuter; NEG = negation; NOM = nominative; NPST = non-past; OBJ = object; OBL = oblique; OPT = optative; PFV = perfective; PL = plural; POSS = possessive; POT = potential; PROH = prohibitive; PROX = proximal; PRS = present; PSP = prospective; PST =

past; REAL = realis; REC = recent; SBJ = subject; SBJV = subjunctive; SG = singular; SFP = sentence-final particle; SPVP = suffixed pronoun verb phrase; SS = same subject; STAT = stative; TS = transitive suffix.

Appendix – Language Sample

The classification is based on the *World Atlas of Language Structures* (Haspelmath *et al.* 2005)

Family	(Subfamily)/Genus	Language	Geographic location
Afro-Asiatic	Berber	**Tamasheq**	Burkina Faso (North-East)
	Cushitic	**Gede'o**	Ethiopia
	Eastern Cushitic	**Dhaasanac**	Ethiopia
		Somali	Somalia
	Chadic		
	Biu Mandara	**Hdi**	Cameroon, Nigeria
		Mina	Cameroon
	West Chadic	**Hausa**	Niger, Nigeria
	Semitic	**Arabic (Cairene)**	Egypt
		Hebrew (Modern)	Israel
		Maltese	Malta
Algic	Algonquian	**Passamaquoddy-Maliseet**	USA (Maine), Canada (Quebec)
Altaic	Mongolic	**Mangghuer**	China (Qinghai)
	Turkic	**Kazakh**	Kazakhstan
		Turkish	Turkey
		Tuvan	Mongolia, Russia (Tuvan)
	Tungusic	**Even**	Russia (Siberia)
		Manchu	China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning)
		Udihe	Russia (Siberia)
Andamanese	South Andamanese	**Önge**	India (Andaman Islands)
Arauan		**Jarawara**	Brazil (Amazonas)
		Paumarí	Brazil (Amazonas)
Araucanian		**Mapudungun**	Chile, Brazil
Arawakan		**Apurinã**	Brazil (Acre, Amazonas)
		Baure	Bolivia
		Tariana	Brazil (Amazonas)
Australian	Pama-Nyungan	**Arabana**	Australia (South Australia)
		Diyari	Australia (South Australia)
		Gumbaynggir	Australia (New South Wales)
		Kugu Nganhcara	Australia (Queensland)
		Kuku Yalanji	Australia (Queensland)
		Nyangumarta	Australia (Western Australia)
		Pitjantjatjara	Australia (South Australia, Northern Territory)
		Pitta-Pitta	Australia (Queensland)
	Gunwinyguan		
	Gunwinygic	**Bininj Gun-Wok**	Australia (Northern Territory)
	Nunggubuyu	**Nunggubuyu**	Australia (Northern Territory)
	Yangmanic	**Wardaman**	Australia (Northern Territory)
	Gaagudju	**Gaagudju**	Australia (Northern Territory)
	Limilngan	**Limilngan**	Australia (Northern Territory)
	Tangkic	**Kayardild**	Australia (Queensland)
		Yukulta	Australia (Queensland)
	West Barkly	**Jingulu**	Australia (Northern Territory)
Austro-Asiatic	Munda	**Santali**	India (Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Tripura, West Bengal)
	Mon-Khmer		
	Aslian	**Jahai**	Malaysia (Peninsular Malaysia)
	Viet-Muong	**Vietnamese**	Vietnam

Austronesian	Western Malayo-Polynesian		
	Sundic	**Javanese**	Indonesia (Java, Bali)
		Madurese	Indonesia (Java)
		Mualang	Indonesia (Kalimantan province)
	Sulawesi	**Tukang Besi**	Indonesia (Sulawesi)
	Meso-Philippine	**Tagalog**	Philippines
	Northern-Philippine	**Yami**	Taiwan
	Yapese	**Yapese**	Micronesia
	Eastern Malayo-Polynesian		
	Oceanic	**Araki**	Vanuatu
		Anejom	Vanuatu
		Erromangan	Vanuatu
		Efate (South)	Vanuatu
		Hoava	Solomon Islands
		Kokota	Solomon Islands
		Kwamera	Vanuatu (Tanna)
		Maori	New Zealand
		Mwotlap	Vanuatu (Motalava)
		Tawala	Papua New Guinea (Milne Bay Area)
		Tokelauan	Tokelau
		Toqabaqita	Solomon Islands
		Tuvaluan	Tuvalu
	South Halmahera – West New Guinea	**Taba**	Indonesia (Maluku)
	Central Malayo-Polynesian	**Tetun (Fehan)**	East Timor
	Tsouic	**Tsou**	Taiwan
Barbacoan		**Awa Pit**	Colombia, Ecuador
Bosavi		**Edolo**	Papua New Guinea (Southern Highlands Province, Western Province)
Caddoan		**Caddo**	USA (Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas)
Cariban		**Apalai**	Brazil (Pará)
		Trio	Suriname
Chapacura-Wanhan		**Wari'**	Brazil (Rondónia)
Chibchan	Talamanca	**Teribe**	Costa Rica, Panama
Dravidian	Central Dravidian	**Kolami**	India (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra)
	South-Central Dravidian	**Koṇḍa**	India (Andhra Pradesh)
	Southern Dravidian	**Kodava**	India (Karnataka)
		Malayalam	India (Kerala)
		Tamil	India, Sri Lanka
Eskimo-Aleut		**Kangiryuarmiut**	Canada, Nunavut
Guahiban		**Guahibo (Sikuani)**	Colombia
Hokan	Yuman	**Tiipay (Jamul)**	USA (California), Mexico (Baja California)
Indo-European	Albanian	**Albanian**	Albania
	Armenian	**Armenian (Eastern)**	Armenia
	Baltic	**Latvian**	Latvia
	Celtic	**Scottish Gaelic**	United Kingdom
	Germanic	**German**	Germany, Austria, Switzerland
	Indic	**Bagri**	India (Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan)
		Oriya	India (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal)
	Romance	**Italian**	Italy, Switzerland (Canton Ticino)
		Mesoccan	Switzerland (Canton Ticino)
		Portuguese	Portugal
		Romanian	Romania, Moldova

	Slavic	**Russian**	Russia
		Upper Sorbian	Germany
Iroquoian	Northern Iroquoian	**Tuscarora**	USA (North Carolina, Virginia)
Kartvelian		**Laz**	Georgia, Turkey
Keresan		**Laguna Keres**	USA (New Mexico)
Marind	South Bird's Head	**Inanwatan**	Papua New Guinea (South Bird's Head Island)
Mayan		**Sipakapense Maya**	Guatemala
		Tzutujil	Guatemala
		Yucatec	Mexico (Campeche, Quintana Roo, Yucatán)
Mixe-Zoque		**Chimalapa Zoque (San Miguel)**	Mexico (Oaxaca)
Muskogean		**Koasati**	USA (Alabama)
Na-Dene	Athapaskan	**Dëne Sųłiné**	Canada (Northwest Territories, Manitoba, Saskatchewan)
		Slave	Canada (Northwest Territories)
Nakh-Daghestanian	Daghestanian		
	Avar-Andic-Tsezic	**Chamalal**	Russia (Dagestan)
		Godoberi	Russia (Dagestan)
		Hunzib	Russia (Dagestan)
	Lak-Dargwa	**Icari Dargwa**	Russia (Dagestan)
	Lezgic	**Lezgian**	Russia (Dagestan), Azerbaijan
Nambikuaran		**Nambikuara**	Brazil (Mato Grosso)
		Sabanê	Brazil (Mato Grosso)
Niger-Congo	Atlantic		
	Northern Atlantic	**Noon**	Senegal
	Southern Atlantic	**Kisi**	Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone
	Benue-Congo		
	Bantoid	**Babungo**	Cameroon
		Chichewa	Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe
		Chingoni	Mozambique, Tanzania
		Kitalinga	Congo, Uganda
		Lingala	Congo (Bandundu Province, Equateur Province)
	Platoid	**Fyem**	Nigeria
	Mande		
	Eastern Mande	**Boko**	Benin
	Kwa	**Ewe**	Ghana, Togo
Nilo-Saharan	Kunama	**Kunama**	Eritrea, Ethiopia
	Central Sudanic		
	Bongo Bagirmi	**Mbay**	Chad
	Eastern Sudanic		
	Nilotic	**Lango**	Uganda
		Pokot	Kenya, Uganda
Northwest Caucasian		**Abkhaz**	Georgia
Oto-Manguean	Mixtecan	**Chalcatongo Mixtec**	Mexico (Oaxaca)
Quechuan		**Quechua (Ecuadorean)**	Ecuador
Salishan	Central Salish	**Upriver Halkomelem**	Canada (British Columbia)
	Interior Salish	**Lillooet**	Canada (British Columbia)
Sepik	East Sepik	**Manambu**	Papua New Guinea (East Sepik Province)

Sino-Tibetan	Chinese	**Cantonese**	China (Guangdong, Guangxi, Macau)
	Tibeto-Burman		
	Bodic	**Athpare**	Nepal
		Dzongkha	Bhutan
		Manange	Nepal
		Newari (Dolakha)	Nepal
		Sherpa	Nepal
		Tamang	Nepal
		Thakali	Nepal
	Kuki-Chin-Naga	**Ao (Mongsen)**	India (Assam, Nagaland)
		Hakha Lai	Myanmar
		Meithei	India (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal)
	rGyalrong	**Caodeng rGyalrong**	China (Sichuan)
	Qiangic	**Qiang**	China (Sichuan)
	Tanic	**Galo**	India (Arunachal Pradesh)
Solomons East-Papuan		**Bilua**	Solomon Islands
		Lavukaleve	Solomon Islands
Tacanan		**Cavineña**	Bolivia
Tai-Kadai	Kam-Tai	**Lao**	Laos, Thailandia
Totonacan		**Misantla Totonac**	Mexico (Veracruz)
Torricelli	Kombio-Arapesh	**Bukiyip**	Papua New Guinea (East Sepik Province)
Trans-New Guinea	Awju-Dumut	**Korowai**	Indonesia (West Papua – Irian Jaya)
	Binanderean	**Korafe**	Papua New Guinea (Oro Province)
	Chimbu	**Golin**	Papua New Guinea (Simbu Province)
	Dani	**Dani (Lower Grand Valley)**	Indonesia (West Papua – Irian Jaya)
	Koiarian	**Koiari**	Papua New Guinea (Central Province)
	Madang	**Kobon**	Papua New Guinea (Madang Province, Western Highlands Province)
		Tauya	Papua New Guinea (Madang Province)
Tupian	Tupi-Guaraní	**Tapiete**	Paraguay
Uralic	Finno-Ugric		
	Finnic	**Finnish**	Finland
	Ugric	**Hungarian**	Hungary
		Vogul (Mansi)	Russia (Khanty-Mansi)
Uto-Aztecan	Aztecan	**Pipil**	El Salvador
	Numic	**Timbisha**	USA (California, Nevada)
	Takic	**Cupeño**	USA (California)
Wappo-Yukian	Wappo	**Wappo**	USA (California)
Yukaghir		**Tundra Yukaghir**	Russia (Siberia)
Isolates		**Ainu**	Japan (Hokkaido)
		Basque	France, Spain
		Burushaski	Pakistan
		Chitimacha	USA (Louisiana)
		Japanese	Japan
		Korean	Korea
		Kusunda	Nepal
		Kwaza	Brazil
		Mosetén	Bolivia
		Movima	Bolivia
		Nivkh	Russia (Siberia)
		Puinave	Colombia, Venezuela
		Urarina	Peru

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